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Abstract. We extend symbolic protocol analysis to apply to protocols
using Diffie-Hellman operations. Diffie-Hellman operations act on a cyclic
group of prime order, together with an exponentiation operator. The
exponents form a finite field. This rich algebraic structure has resisted
previous symbolic approaches.
We work in an algebra defined by the normal forms of a rewriting theory
(modulo associativity and commutativity). These normal forms allow
us to define our crucial notion of indicator, a vector of integers that
summarizes how many times each secret exponent appears in a message.
We prove that the adversary can never construct a message with a new
indicator in our adversary model.
Using this invariant, we prove the main security goals achieved by several
different protocols that use Diffie-Hellman operators in subtle ways.
We also give a model-theoretic justification of our rewriting theory: the
theory proves all equations that are uniformly true as the order of the
cyclic group varies.
1 Introduction
Despite vigorous research in symbolic methods for cryptographic protocol analy-
sis, many gaps and limitations remain. While systems such as NPA-Maude [17],
ProVerif [6], CPSA [33], and Scyther [12] are extremely useful, great ingenuity
is still needed—as for instance in [29]—to analyze protocols that use fundamen-
tal cryptographic ideas such as Diffie-Hellman key agreement (henceforth, DH).
Moreover, important types of protocols, such as implicitly authenticated key-
agreement, appear to be out of reach of known symbolic techniques. Indeed, for
these protocols, computational techniques have also led to considerable contro-
versy, with arduous proofs that provide little confidence [25, 27, 28, 31].
In this paper we present foundational results and a new analysis technique
that together expand the range of applicability of symbolic analysis. In prepa-
ration for stating our contributions we remind the reader of the basics of the
Diffie-Hellman key exchange [13]. In the protocol’s original form, the principals
A,B agree on a suitable prime p, and a generator 1 < g < p such that the powers
of g form a cyclic group of some large prime order q. For a particular session, A
⋆ We gratefully acknowledge support by the National Science Foundation under grant
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and B choose random values x, y respectively, raising a base g to these powers
mod p:
A, x •
gx // •
gyoo B, y (1)
They can then both compute the value (gy)x = gxy = (gx)y (modulo p, as we
will no longer explicitly repeat). We can regard gxy as a new shared secret for
A,B. This is reasonable because of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption
(DDH), which is the assumption that gxy is indistinguishable from the gz we
would get from a randomly chosen z, for any observer who was given neither
x nor y. The protocol is thus secure against a passive adversary, who observes
what the compliant principals do, but can neither create messages nor alter (or
misdirect) messages of compliant principals.
However, an active adversary can choose its own x′, y′, sending gy
′
to A
instead of gy, and sending gx
′
to B instead of gx. Now, each of A,B actually
shares one key with the adversary, who can act as a man in the middle, re-
encrypting messages in any conversation between A and B. Various protocols
have been proposed to achieve a range of security goals in the presence of an
active attacker, such as implicit authentication, forward secrecy, and preventing
impersonation attacks. In Section 2 we describe some of these protocols.
The algebra of the structures on which DH protocols operate has been an
obstacle to analyzing them These structures are cyclic groups of some prime
order q, together with an exponentiation operator. The exponents are integers
modulo the prime q, which form a field of characteristic q. We will call such
structures DH-structures. The algebraic richness of DH-structures has resisted
full symbolic formalization, despite substantial steps for subalgebras [17,26,29].
In this paper, we make five contributions.
1. We represent security goals as logical formulas about transmission and re-
ception events, together with freshness and non-compromise assumptions.
These clean, structural definitions are easy to work with, in contrast with
the procedural notations prevalent among cryptographers. They are based
on strand spaces [21, 35] as a model of protocol execution.
2. We give a new treatment of the values used for DH exchanges. These values
are characterized by a set of equations, namely the equations s = t that are
valid in infinitely many DH-structures. In fact, we prove that if an equation
holds in infinitely many DH-structures then it holds in all of them.
a. Using an ultraproduct construction, we build a single modelMD that re-
alizes precisely those equations true in all (equivalently, infinitely many)
DH-structures. (Theorem 20)
b. We define an equational theory AGˆ that can be presented by a rewrite
system that is terminating and confluent modulo associativity and com-
mutativity (Theorem 1). Furthermore, for all equations s = t, AGˆ
rewrites s and t to the same normal form if and only if s = t is true
in MD for all values of its free variables (Theorem 20). The normal
forms of this rewrite system represent the messages.
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3. The theory of DH-structures suggests an adversary model (Section 5). The
uniformly algebraic adversary is the Dolev-Yao adversary augmented with
the functions in the signature of DH-structures. These functions are gov-
erned by the equations s = t derivable in AG .ˆ Thus—given the correspon-
dence between AGˆ and truth in DH-structures—the adversary can rely on
any equation that, as the size of the underlying cyclic group grows, is valid
infinitely often.
4. Using the AGˆ normal forms, we define the indicators of a message. Indi-
cators count occurrences of secret values in exponents. We prove that the
adversary cannot create a message with a new indicator. If the adversary
transmits a message with a particular indicator, then it must have received
some message with that indicator previously (Theorem 5). This invariant
extends the Honest Ideal theorem [35] to the algebra AG .ˆ It is our primary
proof method.
5. To illustrate the power of our method, we prove about a dozen different
security goals for three protocols (Sections 7 and 8). These implicitly au-
thenticated DH protocols have previously resisted attempts to give concise,
convincing proofs of the goals they achieve. We also use our method to show
why certain protocols do not meet some goals, matching the relevant attacks
from the cryptographic literature.
The set of indicators of a message is a set of vectors that count how many
times uncompromised values appear in exponents. They are a refinement of
the standard notion of an atom occurring in term, needed since our terms are
considered modulo equations. For instance, suppose that in some execution, the
exponents a, b, x, y are assumed uncompromised, where x, y are ephemeral secret
values and a, b are long-term secret values. The sequence 〈a, b, x, y〉 determines
a basis for writing these indicator vectors.
Relative to this basis, the factor gxy has indicator 〈0, 0, 1, 1〉 because a, b
appear 0 times each, and x, y appear once each. gx/y would have indicator
〈0, 0, 1,−1〉, since y appears −1 times, i.e. inverted. The factor gax has indicator
〈1, 0, 1, 0〉 since a, x appear once. When we multiply factors, we take unions of
indicators. Thus, gxygbxgaygab has indicators
{〈0, 0, 1, 1〉, 〈0, 1, 1, 0〉, 〈1, 0, 0, 1〉, 〈1, 1, 0, 0〉}.
There is good motivation for protocols in which each non-zero integer in an
indicator is ±1 [8].
In our model, when the indicator basis consists of uncompromised exponents,
adversary actions never produce any message containing any new indicator (The-
orem 5). If the adversary transmits a message with some indicator vector v, then
it previously received some message with that indicator vector v. Only the reg-
ular, non-adversary, participants can emit messages with new indicators.
This idea, which is natural and appealing for DH, is challenging to justify,
which is probably why it is not familiar from the cryptographic literature. Its
soundness as a proof technique rests on our foundational results concerning DH-
structures (contribution 2).
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Structure of this paper. We next, in Sec. 2, introduce a few protocols we
will use as running examples. Sec. 3 introduces the strand space theory, and the
Sec. 4 presents our equational theory AG .ˆ We use strand spaces in Sec. 5 to define
iadh protocols and the adversary actions. Section 6 proves the key limitative
theorem on indicators and the adversary. Sec. 7 defines a variety of security goals
for iadh protocols, and applies the key limitative result to establish these goals;
the focus shifts specifically to implicit authentication in Sec. 8. Sec. 9 takes a
model-theoretic point of view on DH-structures and proves completeness of the
theory AG .ˆ In Sec. 10, we comment on some related work and conclude.
2 Some Protocols of Interest
We start by describing some illustrative protocols at the level of detail typically
seen in the literature. In order not to prejudice ourselves in evaluating possi-
ble attacks, we will write RB for the public value that A receives, purportedly
from B, rather than writing gy, since no one yet knows whether it is the same
value that B sent. We likewise write RA for the public value that B receives,
purportedly from A. The participants hope that RA = g
x and RB = g
y.
The Station-to-Station protocol [14] authenticates the Diffie-Hellman ex-
change by digital signatures on the exchange. In a simplified STS, the exchange
in Eqn. 1 is followed by the signed messages:
A •
[[ gx‖RB ]]sk(A)// •
[[ gy‖RA ]]sk(B)oo B (2)
The signatures1 exclude a man in the middle, assuming some public key infras-
tructure to certify sk(A), sk(B). The costs of STS includes an additional message
transmission and reception for each participant, in each session. Moreover, each
participant must also prepare one digital signature and also verify one digital
signature specifically for that session. There is also a privacy concern, since the
signatures publicly associate A and B in a shared session.
An alternative to using per-session digital signatures is implicit authentica-
tion [5]. Here the goal is to ensure that any principal that can compute the
same value as A can only be B, and conversely. To implement this idea, each
principal maintains a long-term secret, which we will write as a for principal A,
and as b for B; they publish the long-term public values ga, gb, which we will
refer to as YA, YB, etc. The trick is to build the use of the private values a, b into
the computation of the shared secret, so that only A,B can do it. In the “Uni-
fied Model” UM of Ankney, Johnson, and Matyas [2], the principals combine
long term values with short term values by concatenating and hashing. They
send only the messages shown in Eqn. 1, and then—letting H(x) be a hash of
x—compute their keys:
A : k = H(YB
a ‖ RB
x) B : k = H(YA
b ‖ RA
y), (3)
1 We write t ‖ t′ for the concatenation of t with t′. A digitally signed message [[ t ]]sk(A)
means t ‖ sig(H(t), sk(A)), where sig is a signature algorithm, H(t) is a hash of t,
and sk(A) is a signing key owned by A.
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obtaining the shared value H(gab ‖ gxy) if RA = g
x and RB = g
y. Again, public
key infrastructure must associate the public value YP with the intended peer P .
However, no digital signature is generated or checked specific to this run. If A has
frequent sessions with B, A can amortize the cost of the certificate verification
by keeping YB in secure storage.
Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (MQV) [30] relies only on algebraic operations. MQV
computes the key via the rules:
A : k = (RB · YB
[RB ])sA B : k = (RA · YA
[RA])sB (4)
where sA = x+a[RA] and sB = y+ b[RB]. The “box” operator coerces numbers
mod p to a convenient form in which they can be used as exponents. In the
literature this is written in the typographically more cumbersome form of a bar,
as RB. In a successful run, A obtains the value
(gy · (gb)[g
y ])sA = (g(y+b[g
y ]))(x+a[g
x]) = g(sB ·sA) (5)
and B obtains gsA·sB , which is the same value. MQV differs from UM only in
the function that the principals use to compute the key. MQV’s key computation
makes it algebraically challenging to model and to analyze. Controversy about
its security remains [25, 27, 28, 31].
3 Background: Strand Spaces
In this paper, we adopt the strand space formalism, although allowing messages
to form more complex algebraic structures than in earlier papers, e.g. [21, 35].
Strands. A strand is a sequence of local actions called nodes. A node may be
either:
– a message transmission;
– a message reception; or else
– a neutral node. Neutral nodes are local events in which a principal consults
or updates its local state [22].
If n is a node, and the message t is transmitted, received, or coordinated with
the state on n, then we write t = msg(n). We write bullets • for transmission and
reception events and circles ◦ for neutral events, involving only the local state.
Double arrows indicate successive events on the same strand, e.g. ◦ ⇒ • ⇒ •.
Each strand is either a regular strand, which represents the sequence of local
actions made be a single principal in a single local session of a protocol, or else
an adversary strand, which represents a single action of the adversary.
A protocol is a set of regular strands, called the roles of the protocol. We
assume that every protocol contains a specific role, called the listener role, which
consists of a single reception node n =→ •. We use listener strands to provide
“witnesses” when msg(n) has been disclosed, especially to specify confidentiality
properties.
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Adversary strands consist of zero or more reception nodes followed by one
transmission node. They represent the adversary obtaining the transmitted value
as a function of the values received; or creating it, if there are no reception
nodes. All values that the adversary handles are received or transmitted; none
are silently obtained from long-term state. In fact, allowing the adversary to use
neutral nodes—or strands of other forms—provides no additional power. (See
Section 6.)
We regard the messages transmitted and received on • nodes, and obtained
from long-term state on neutral nodes ◦, as forming an abstract algebra. Con-
catenation and encryption are operators that construct values in the algebra
from a pair of given values, and we regard v0 ‖ v1 as equal to u0 ‖ u1 just in case
v0 = u0 and v1 = u1. Similarly, {|v0|}v1 equals {|u0|}u1 just in case v0 = u0 and
v1 = u1. That is, they are free operators. For our present purposes, it suffices to
represent other operators such as hash functions and digital signatures in terms
of these.
The basic values that are neither concatenations nor encryptions include
principal names; keys of various kinds; group elements x, x · y, and gx; and text
values. We regard variables (“indeterminates”) such as x as values distinct from
values of other forms, e.g. products z · y, or from other variables. A variable
represents a “degree of freedom” in a description of some executions, which can
be instantiated or restricted. It may also represent an independent choice, as A’s
choice of a group element x to build gx is independent of B’s choice of y. DH
algebras are defined later in this section as the normal forms of an AC rewriting
system.
Ingredients and origination. A value t1 is an ingredient of another value t2,
written t1 ⊑ t2, if t1 contributes to t2 via concatenation or as the plaintext of
encryptions: ⊑ is the least reflexive, transitive relation such that:
t1 ⊑ t1 ‖ t2, t2 ⊑ t1 ‖ t2, t1 ⊑ {|t1|}t2 .
By this definition, t2 ⊑ {|t1|}t2 implies that (anomalously) t2 ⊑ t1. For basic
(non-encrypted, non-concatenated) values a, b, we have a ⊑ b iff a = b.
A value t originates on a transmission node n if t ⊑ msg(n), so that it is an
ingredient of the message sent on n, but it was not an ingredient of any message
earlier on the same strand. That is, m⇒+ n implies t 6⊑ msg(m).
A basic value is uniquely originating in an execution if there is exactly one
node at which it originates. Freshly chosen nonces or DH values gx are typically
assumed to be uniquely originating.
A value is non-originating if there is no node at which it originates. An un-
compromised long term secret such as a signature key or a private decryption
key is assumed to be non-originating. Because adversary strands receive their
arguments as incoming messages, an adversary strand that encrypts a message
receives its key as a message, thus originating somewhere. Decryption and sig-
nature creation are similar.
The set of non-originating values is denoted non; the set of uniquely origi-
nating values is denoted unique.
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Very often in DH-style protocols unique origination and non-origination are
used in tandem. When a compliant principal generates a random x and transmits
gx, the former will be non-originating and the latter uniquely originating.
Executions are bundles. The strand space theory formalizes protocol execu-
tions by bundles. A bundle is a directed, acyclic graph. Its vertices are nodes on
some strands (which may include both regular and adversary strands). Its edges
include the strand succession edges n1 ⇒ n2, as well as communication edges
written n1 → n2. Such a dag B = (V,E⇒ ∪ E→) is a bundle if it is causally
self-contained, meaning:
– If n2 ∈ V and n1 ⇒ n2, then n1 ∈ V and (n1, n2) ∈ E⇒;
– If n2 ∈ V is a reception node, then there is a unique transmission node
n1 ∈ V such that msg(n2) = msg(n1) and (n1, n2) ∈ E→;
– The precedence ordering B for B, defined to be (E⇒ ∪ E→)
∗, is a well-
founded relation.
The first clause says that a node has a causal explanation from the occurrence
of the earlier nodes on its strand. The second says that any reception has the
causal explanation that the message was obtained from some particular trans-
mission node. The last clause says that causality is globally well-founded. It
holds automatically in finite dags B, which are the only ones we consider here.
When we assume that a value is non-originating, or uniquely originating, we
constrain which bundles B are of interest to us, namely those in which the value
originates on no node of B, or on one node of B, respectively.
4 An Equational Theory of Messages
As described in the Introduction, our challenge is to define an equational theory
that captures the relevant algebra of DH structures and admits a notion of
reduction that supports modeling messages as normal forms. By the Decisional
Diffie-Hellman assumption, an adversary cannot retrieve the exponent x from a
value gx that a regular participant has constructed. This limitation is reflected in
our formalism in a straightforward way. Namely, we do not provide a logarithm
function in the signature of DH-structures.
In addition we must confront the fact that the exponents in a DH structure
form a field, and fields cannot be axiomatized by equations.
Our strategy is as follows. We work with a sort G for base-group elements
and a sort E for exponents. The novelty is that we enrich E by adding a subsort
NZE whose intended interpretation is the non-0 elements of E.
The device of expressing “non-zero” as a sort fits well with the philosophy of
capturing uniform capabilities algebraically. For instance no term which is a sum
e1+e2 will inhabit the sortNZE because each finite field has finite characteristic
and so there may be instantiations of the variables in e1 + e2 driving the term
to 0. On the other hand, we will want to ensure that NZE is closed under
multiplication; this is the role of the operator ∗∗ below.
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Sorts: G, E, and NZE, with NZE a subsort of E;
· : G ×G→ G
1 :→ G
inv : G→ G
exp : : G ×E → E
box : G→ NZE
+, ∗ : E × E → E
1 :→ NZE
i : NZE → NZE
∗∗ : NZE → NZE
Table 1. The signature for AGˆ
We show in this section that AGˆ admits a confluent and terminating notion
of reduction. In section 9 we prove a theorem that describes the sense in which
AGˆ captures the equalities that hold in almost all finite prime fields.
Definition 1. The theory AGˆ is the equational theory comprising the sorts and
operation given in Table 1 and the equations given in Table 2. We write box(t)
as [t], and we write exp(t, e) and te.
We next construct an associative-commutative rewrite system from AG .ˆ We
orient each equation in Table 2 in the left-to-write direction, except for the
associativity and commutativity of ·,+, and ∗ . Confluence requires the new
rules shown in Table 3, corresponding to equations derivable from AGˆ that are
needed to join critical pairs.
Definition 2. Let R be the set of rewrite rules given in Table 2—read from
left to right, but without associativity and commutativity—and in Table 3. The
rewrite relation→AGˆ is rewriting with R modulo associativity and commutativity
of ·,+, and ∗ .
Theorem 1. The reduction →AGˆ is terminating and confluent modulo AC.
Proof. Termination can be established using the AC-recursive path order defined
by Rubio [34] with a precedence in which exponentiation is greater than inverse,
which is in turn greater than multiplication (and 1). This has been verified with
the Aprove termination tool [19].
Then confluence follows from local confluence, which is established via a
verification that all critical pairs are joinable. This result has been confirmed
with the Maude Church-Rosser Checker [15].
Terms that are irreducible with respect to →AGˆ are called normal forms.
The following taxonomy of the normal forms will be crucial in what follows,
most of all in the definition of indicators, Definition 4. The proof is a routine
simultaneous induction over the size of e and t.
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(G, ·, inv , 1)
is an abelian group
(a · b) · c = a · (b · c)
a · b = b · a
b · 1 = b
b · inv(b) = 1
(E,+, 0,−, ∗ , 1, i)
is a commutative unitary ring
(x+ y) + z = x+ (y + z)
x+ y = y + x
x+ 0 = x
x+ (−x) = 0
(x ∗ y) ∗ z = x ∗ (y ∗ z)
x ∗ y = y ∗ x
x ∗ (y + z) = (x ∗ y) + (z + z)
x ∗ 1 = x
Multiplicative inverse, closure
at sort NZE
u ∗∗ v = u ∗ v
i(u ∗ v) = i(u) ∗ i(v)
i(1) = 1
i(i(w)) = w
Exponentiation makes G
a unitary right E-module
(ax)y = ax ∗ y
a
1 = a
(a · b)x = ax · bx
a
(x+y) = ax · ay
1x = 1
Table 2. The theory AGˆ
Lemma 1. 1. If e : E is a normal form then e is a sum m1 + . . .+mn where
(i) each mi is of the form e1 ∗ . . . ∗ ek k ≥ 0, (ii) no ei is of the form
i(ej), and (iii) each ei is one of:
x, i(x), [t], i([t])
with x a G-variable and t : G a G-normal form.
The case n = 0 is taken to mean e = 0; the case k = 0 is taken to mean
mi = 1 We call terms of the form mi irreducible monomials
2. If t : G is a normal form then t is a product t1 · . . . · tn, n ≥ 0 where
(i) no ti is of the form inv (tj), and (ii) each ti is one of:
v inv(v) ve inv (ve)
with v a G-variable e : E an irreducible monomial.
The case n = 0 is taken to mean t = 1.
5 Formalizing the Protocols and the Adversary
We consider a collection of protocols that all involve the same strands, i.e. se-
quences of transmissions, receptions, and neutral events. They differ almost ex-
clusively in the key computations used to generate the shared secret.
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At sort G
inv(1) → 1
inv(a · b) → inv(a) · inv(b)
inv(inv(b)) → b
(inv(a))x → inv(ax)
a
0 → 1
a
−(x) → inv(ax)
At sort E
−(0) → 0
−(x+ y) → −(x) + (−(y))
−(−(x)) → x
0 ∗ x → 0
−(x) ∗ y → −(x ∗ y)
Table 3. Additional rewrite rules for →AGˆ
◦ +3
A,a,cA
• +3
gx

• +3 • +3 ◦
d(A,B)
RA
RB
OO
cB
OO
cA

◦ +3
B,b,cB
• +3 • +3
gy
OO
• +3 ◦
d(B,A)
cP = [[ cert YP ‖ P ]]sk(CA) d(P, P
′) = keyrec P ‖ P ′ ‖ K
Fig. 1. iadh Initiator and Responder Strands
MQV and UM [5] both fit our pattern. Various other protocols fit this pattern
with some cajoling. KEA [5] fits the pattern too, although its key computation
uses addition mod p to combine gay and gbx. Cremers-Feltz’s protocol CF [11], in
which the shared secret is g(x+a)(y+b), almost fits: They use the digitally signed
messages [[RA ]]sk(A) and [[RB ]]sk(B). Our analysis is equally applicable in this
case.
In these protocol descriptions, we make explicit aspects that are normally
left implicit. One is the interaction with the certifying authority. Kaliski [25]
argues that the certification protocol should be considered in analysis, because
the correctness of forms of a protocol may depend on exactly what checks a ca
has actually made. We will also show how the local session interacts with the
local principal state.
The IADH initiator and responder roles. We summarize the activities of
regular initiators and responders in Figure 1. We specify, for the initiator A:
1. A retrieves its principal name A, its long term secret a, and its public cer-
tificate cA from its secure storage.
2. A chooses a fresh ephemeral x, transmitting RA = g
x.
3. A receives some RB, which it checks to be a non-trivial group element, i.e. a
value of the form gy for some y 6= 0, 1 mod q.
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4. It receives a certificate cB associating YB with B’s identity. We do not specify
here how the participant determines what name B to require in this certifi-
cate, or how it determines which cas to accept. This is implementation-
dependent.
5. Finally, A performs the protocol-specific key computation to determine K.
A checks the exponentiations yield non-1 values, and fails if any do. On
success, A deposits a key record into its local state database, so that K may
be used for a secure conversation between A and B.
In clause 2, A chooses x freshly. Because A never sends x as an ingredient in any
message—but only gx—it follows that x has negligible probability of occurring
in a message. After all, A does not send it; any other regular participant is
overwhelmingly unlikely to choose the same value again; and the adversary is
overwhelmingly unlikely to choose it, e.g. as a guess. For this reason we model
x as being “non-originating”; for the same reason, gx is declared to be uniquely
originating.
We always add the assumptions that x is non-originating and gx is uniquely
originating whenever a regular strand selects RA = g
x. In particular, since x
is a fresh, unconstrained choice that the principal makes, we always instantiate
it with a simple value, essentially a parameter, and never with a compound
expression like y · 1/z. Essentially, x is a generator of the algebra of normal
forms of AG .ˆ
A responder B behaves in a corresponding fashion, with predictable changes
to the names of its parameters. The only real change is that it receives an
ephemeral public value RA in step 2 before generating its ephemeral secret y
and transmitting its ephemeral public value gy in step 3. We will assume that y
is non-originating and gy is uniquely originating whenever a regular responder
strand selects RB = g
y.
The parameters to an initiator strand are A,B, a, x, YB , RB. We write them
in this order, and refer (e.g.) to the fourth parameter as x, despite the fact that
in different instances of the role have different choices for the parameter x. The
parameters to a responder strand are A,B, b, y, YA, RA; thus, we will write the
(purported) initiator’s name first, and the (actual, known) responder’s name
second.
We make an assumption on the principal states, namely that the node ◦ A, a, cA
starting an initiator or responder strand is possible only if the same principal
A has on some earlier occasion received a certificate cA, and deposited it into
its state. Certificates do not emerge ex nihilo. Gathering our assumptions on
regular initiator and responder strands:
Assumption 2 Suppose that B is a bundle.
1. If B contains an initiator strand s with parameters A,B, a, x, YB , RB, then:
a. x is non-originating, and gx is uniquely originating.
b. x is a parameter, not a compound expression.
c. For some transmission node n ∈ B, cA ⊑ msg(n) and n B s1, where s1
is the first node on strand s.
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2. Symmetrically for responder strands s in B, with parameters A,B, b, y, YA, RA:
a. y is non-originating, and gy is uniquely originating.
b. y is a parameter, not a compound expression.
c. For some transmission node n ∈ B, cB ⊑ msg(n) and n B s1, where
s1 is the first node on strand s.
Our results do not depend on the specific ordering of events in initiator and
responder strands. As long as the neutral node retrieving the long term secret
and certificate occurs before any of the other events, and as long as the neutral
node depositing the K into the state occurs only after the other event, then
our results remain correct. They also do not distinguish between initiator and
responder strands: We would allow two initiator strands to succeed in implicit
authentication, for instance.
Key computation functions. The shared secret K is generated using differ-
ent functions in different iadh protocols. In the Unified Model UM, the key is
generated by
A : k = H(YB
a ‖ RB
x) B : k = H(YA
b ‖ RA
y) (6)
In the optimistic case that RA = g
x and RB = g
y
K = H(gab ‖ gxy) (7)
In MQV the key is generated by
A : K = (RB · YB
[RB ])sA B : K = (RA · YA
[RA])sB (8)
(where sA = (x+ a[g
x]) and sB = (y + b[g
y])), so when RA = g
x and RB = g
y
the principals compute
(g(y+b[g
y ]))(x+a[g
x]) = gxy · gxb[g
y] · gya[g
x] · gab[g
x][gy ] (9)
The key computation for Cremers-Feltz CF—somewhat simplified to make it
more parallel to the UM and MQV computations—is:
A : K = (RB · YB)
(a+x) B : K = (RA · YA)
(b+y) (10)
so that, in the same optimistic case,
(gy · gb)(x+a) = g(y+b)(x+a) = gxy · gxb · gya · gab (11)
The occurrences of a, b, x, y in these terms show us a contrast between UM
and the other two. In the latter, all four pairs consisting of one parameter from
a, x and one from b, y, appearing together, may be found in the exponent of some
factor of the final shared secret. However, in UM, only two of these pairs appears.
This suggests that UM is more fragile than the latter two, and this explains why
it is vulnerable to key compromise impersonation while the others are not.
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•
pop +3

• +3 ◦
[[ cert req P ‖ Y ]]sk(P )

[[ cert Y ‖ P ]]sk(CA)
OO
•
pop
+3 •
OO
Fig. 2. Strands for Certificate Requests
In Section 9, we will develop an algebraic theory to justify this kind of anal-
ysis.
Requesting and issuing certificates. We also identify protocol roles for
requesting certificates from certificate authorities, and for the CAs to issue them
(Fig. 2). The client makes a request with its name P and public value YP , and,
if successful, receives a certificate which it deposits into its local state. In its
request, a compliant principal named P always chooses a fresh long-term secret
a, and computes Y = ga. The CA, on receiving a request, issues a certificate
after a “proof of possession” protocol pop intended to show P possesses an a
such that ga = Y . We will not make pop explicit.
We assume, whenever a bundle contains a regular certificate request, that
its ga = Y is uniquely originating. Any subsequent use of Y must obtain it
through some sequence of message transmissions and receptions tracing back,
ultimately, to this originating node. We will not, however, always assume a is
non-originating, since carelessness or malice may eventually lead to the disclosure
of a. Instead, if a particular a is non-originating, we will explicitly state that as
a hypothesis in the security goals that depend on it.
We assume the CA is uncompromised, i.e. sk(CA) ∈ non. CA, when receiving
Y , should ensure that Y 6= g0, g1, and that it is a member of the group (e.g. via
the little Fermat test). Hence, there is an e such that Y = ge.
Moreover, a successful pop means that the requester possesses an exponent e
such that Y = ge. The requester is either a regular participant or the adversary.
Thus, either:
– e is some parameter a, and ga originates uniquely on a certificate request
strand; or else
– the request comes from an adversary strand, and e is available to the adver-
sary.
We will model the latter by assuming that the bundle containing this certification
generation strand also contains a listener strand n =→ • with msg(n) = e.
Assumption 3 Let B be a bundle containing [[ cert Y ‖ P ]]sk(CA). Assume
sk(CA) ∈ nonB, and moreover:
1. For a certificate request strand, with parameters P, a,CA:
a. ga originates uniquely;
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b. a is a parameter, not a compound expression.
2. For a CA strand, with parameters P, Y,CA:
a. There exists an e 6= 0, 1 such that Y = ge;
b. Either Y = ga where ga ∈ unique
B
, and ga originates on a regular
certificate request strand, or else there exists n ∈ B with msg(n) = e.
By Clause 2b, if a ∈ nonB, then for at most one P can a certificate [[ cert g
a ‖
P ]]sk(CA) be issued. The iadh protocols are defined by the four roles shown in
Figs. 1–2, using a key computation such as those in MQV, UM, and CF.
The Adversary. An adversary strand has zero or more reception nodes fol-
lowed by a transmission node:
Definition 3. Adversary strands take the forms:
– Emission of a basic value a: 〈+a〉
– Constructor strands: 〈−a1 ⇒ . . .⇒ −an ⇒ +t〉 where is t is in Gen(a1, . . . , an)
– Destructor strands: 〈−t⇒ +s1 . . .⇒ +sn〉 where t is a concatenation of the
values si.
– Encryption strands: 〈−K ⇒ −t⇒ +{|t|}K〉
– Decryption strands: 〈−K−1 ⇒ −{|t|}K ⇒ +t〉
Suppose that S1, . . . , Sk are node-disjoint adversary strands. An adversary web [21]
using S1, . . . , Sk is an acyclic graph whose vertices are the nodes of the Si, where
for each edge (n, n′), either (i) n⇒ n′ on some strand or (ii) n is a transmission
node, n′ is a reception node, and msg(n) = msg(n′).
This adversary model motivates a game between the adversary and the system:
1. The system chooses a security goal Φ, involving secrecy, authentication, key
compromise, etc., as in Figs. 3–6.
2. The adversary chooses a potential counterexample A consisting of regular
strands with equations between values on the nodes, e.g. an equation between
a session key computed by one participant and a session key computed by
another participant.
3. To show that A can occur, the adversary chooses how to generate the mes-
sages in A.
For each message reception node in A, the adversary must provide an accept-
able message in time for that event. The adversary benefits from transmission
events on regular strands, which he can use to build messages for subsequent
reception events. For each reception node, the adversary chooses a recipe,
consisting of an adversary web, using the strands of Def. 3.
This map—which, to every message reception event, associates an adversary
web—is the adversary strategy.
The adversary strategy determines a set of equalities between a value com-
puted by the adversary and a value t “expected” by the recipient, or accept-
able to the recipient. They are the adversary’s proposed equations.
4. The adversary wins if his proposed equations are valid in (Gq , Fq), for in-
finitely many primes q.
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This game may seem too challenging for the adversary. First, it wins only if
the equations are valid, i.e. true for all instances of the variables. However,
the adversary’s proposed equations determine polynomials, and each of these
polynomials has a syntactically determined degree d. If it is not valid, it can
have at most d solutions, independent of the choice of (Gq, Fq). Hence, the set
of values for which the adversary’s strategy works remains small, regardless of
how the cardinality of the structure (Gq, Fq) grows.
Second, the adversary must choose how to generate all the messages, its ad-
versary strategy, before seeing any concrete bitstrings, or indeed learning the
prime q. This objection motivates future research into the computational sound-
ness of our approach. The hardness of DDH seems to suggest that the adversary
acquires no useful advantage from seeing the values gx etc. Any definite claim
would require a reduction argument.
6 Indicators
We turn now to a formal definition of indicators and the proof of a key invariant
that all adversary actions preserve.
Let Zk denote the set of all k-tuples of integers. For intuition about the
following definition, think of N as being a set of non-originating values for a
bundle. If m is a monomial occurring as a subterm of a term t, say that m is
“maximal-monomial” if t has a subterm of the form bm.
Definition 4 (Indicators). Let N = 〈v1, . . . , vd〉 be a vector of NZE-variables.
If m is an irreducible monomial, the N -vector for m is 〈z1, . . . , zk〉 where zi is
the multiplicity of vi in m, counting occurrences of i(vi) negatively.
If e = m1 + . . . +mk is a term of type E, then e is N -free if each mi has
N -vector 〈0, . . . , 0〉.
When t0 is any base term in normal form, then IndN (t0) is the set of all
vectors z such that z is the N -vector of m, where m is a maximal-monomial
subterm of t0.
If t = t1 ‖ t2, then IndN (t) = IndN (t1) ∪ IndN (t2).
If t = {|t1|}t2 , then IndN (t) = IndN (t1).
Thus, IndN (t) for a compound term t is the union
⋃
IndN (t0), taking the union
over all the base terms t0 that are ingredients of t, i.e. t0 ⊑ t.
Example: For N = 〈x, y〉, if t is
gx i(y) · gzx[g
x] · gxx[g
y],
then IndN(t) = {〈1,−1〉, 〈1, 0〉, 〈2, 0〉}. The boxed values do not contribute to
the indicators.
Since we often encounter indicators with no non-zero entries, we will write
0 for this indicator 〈0, . . . , 0〉. We will also write 1x, 1a, etc., for the indicator
that has a single 1 in the position for that parameter, e.g. for 〈0, 0, 1, 0〉 and
〈1, 0, 0, 0〉 if the parameters are a, b, x, y in that order. Every message sent in
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iadh protocols is of this form: All the indicator weight is concentrated in at
most a single 1. A message gc with c 6∈ non has indicator 0.
Since the union
⋃
IndN (t0) is over all the ingredients t0 ⊑ t, it does not
include values used only as keys in encryptions. Thus, a protocol may compute a
secret such as gxy with an indicator 〈0, 0, 1, 1〉 = 1x+1y, and then applies a key
derivation function, obtaining k = kdf(gxy). If participants then send encrypted
messages {|t1|}k, then it has not transmitted a message with indicator 1x + 1y.
Definition 5. Let T = {t1, . . . , tk} be a set of terms. The set Gen(T ) generated
by T is the least set of terms including T and closed under the term-forming
operations.
The term-forming operations cannot cancel to reveal a vi ∈ N :
Theorem 4. Suppose T is a collection of terms such that every e ∈ T of sort
E is N -free. Then
1. every e ∈ Gen(T ) of sort E is N -free, and
2. if u ∈ Gen(T ) is of sort G and z ∈ Ind(u) then for some t ∈ T , z ∈ Ind(t).
Proof. By induction on operations used to construct terms from elements of T .
The interesting cases are when u is of the form u1u2 or t
e where t, u1, u2
and e are each normal form terms in Gen(T ).
In the first case, then, u is a product
t1 · . . . · tn
where each factor comes from u1 or u2. Since each ti is of the form v, inv (v), v
e, or inv(ve),
the normal form of this term results by canceling any factors (from different ui)
that are inverses of each other. No new E-subterms are created, so no new indi-
cator vectors are created, and our assertion follows.
The other case is when u is te. Note that since e is in Gen(T ) we know that e
is N -free. It suffices to show that Ind(te) = Ind(t). Letting t be in normal form,
te is
(t1)
e · . . . · (tn)
e
Each (ti)
e is of the form
ve (i(v))e (ve
′
)e (inv (ve
′
))e
The first two terms are N -free. The second kind of term reduces to ve ∗ e
′
, and
the indicator set for this term is precisely Ind(e) since e′ is N -free. The last term
reduces to inv (ve
′ ∗ e) and we can argue just as in the previous case.
The cases for concatenation and encryption are immediate from the induction
hypothesis, since they simply propagate indicator vectors.
An Adversary Limitation. We justify now our central technique, that the
adversary cannot generate messages with new indicators, using variables of sort
E that are non-originating before node n.
16
Definition 6. A basic value a is non-originating before n in bundle B if, for
all n′ B n, a does not originate at n
′.
The indicator basis IBB(n) of node n, where n is a node of B, is the set:
{a of sort E : a is non-originating before n}.
We assume IBB(n) is ordered in some conventional way.
Theorem 5. Let W be an adversary web of B, and let n be a transmission
node of W , and let N be a sequence of elements drawn from IBB(n). If v ∈
IndN (msg(n)), then there is a regular transmission node n
′ ≺B n in B such that
v ∈ IndN (msg(n
′)).
Proof. Let TR be the set of messages received on W , and let TM be the set
of basic values emitted by W ; set T = TR ∪ TM . The message u = msg(n)
is in Gen(T ). The set TR is N -free, as a consequence of the fact that every
message received on W must have originated, and TM is N -free since it is a set
of basic values not in N (indeed, each term in TM has an empty indicator set).
So Theorem 4 applies. Since each t ∈ TM has empty indicator set we conclude
that every indicator in u comes from a message in TR, as desired.
In iadh protocols, every message from regular participants has indicators in
{0}, {1a}, {1b}, {1x}, {1y}, etc. Since the adversary can never transmit a mes-
sage with any indicators he has not received, no messages with other indicators
will ever be sent or received. Messages encrypted using keys derived from Diffie-
Hellman values preserve this property. Using Thm. 5 and Assumption 3, 2b:
Corollary 1. Let B be a bundle for an iadh protocol using certificates [[ cert ga ‖
P ]]sk(CA) and [[ cert g
α ‖ P ′ ]]sk(CA). If a ∈ nonB and Ind〈a〉(α) 6= 0, then α = e
and P = P ′.
7 Analyzing IADH Protocols
We now embark on analyzing iadh protocols, focusing on UM,MQV, and CF. We
aim to illustrate the way that our algebraic tools—normal forms and indicators—
work together with the more familiar tools of symbolic protocol analysis. These
are notions such as causal well-foundedness that are basic to strand spaces. We
start with properties for which the indicators bear the main burden. In Section 8
we turn to implicit authentication. It requires subtler proofs, which are more
sensitive to the details of the key computation.
We believe that our presentation of security goals is a contribution in itself.
They appear to us to be clear distillations of the structural elements in the goals,
which have often appeared in more cluttered forms—particularly obscured by
more operational ideas—in some of the literature.
We start though with a useful lemma about the session keys produced by
regular strands, saying that they always reflect the parameters of that strand.
17
s ◦ +3 • +3 • +3 • +3 ◦
K
•
Koo
Fig. 3. Key secrecy: This diagram cannot occur
Lemma 2. Let protocol Π be an iadh protocol, but possibly without Assump-
tion 2, Clauses 1a and 2a.
Suppose B is a Π-bundle, and s is a Π initiator or responder strand with
long term secret a and ephemeral value x, succeeding with key K:
Π is UM: If x ∈ nonB, then for K = H(YB
a ‖ RB
x), we have 1x ∈ Ind〈x〉(K).
If a ∈ nonB, then 1a ∈ Ind〈a〉(K).
Π is MQV: If x ∈ nonB, then for K = (RB ·YB
[RB ])sA , we have 1x ∈ Ind〈x〉(K).
If a ∈ nonB, then 1a ∈ Ind〈a〉(K).
Π is CF: If x ∈ nonB, then for K = (RB · YB)
x+a, we have 1x ∈ Ind〈x〉(K). If
a ∈ nonB, then 1a ∈ Ind〈a〉(K).
Proof. For UM, a or x can cancel only if s receives a value RB or Yb with indicator
〈−1〉 for a or x, resp. Hence there is some earlier node m on which some message
with indicator 〈−1〉 was transmitted, and let m0 be a minimal such node.
However, by the definitions, m0 is not a regular node, which transmit only
values with non-negative indicators. By Thm. 5, m0 cannot be an adversary
node either, when a or x ∈ nonB resp.
For MQV, let RB = g
η, where η is a possibly compound value the adversary
may have engineered, and let YB = g
β . Now K = gxη · gaη[g
x] · gxβ[g
η] · gaβ[g
x][gη ].
K may be a-free because gaη[g
x] and gaβ[g
x][gη] cancel. This occurs when aη[gx] =
−aβ[gx][gη], i.e. η = −β[gη]. However, in this case x also cancels out, as xη =
−xβ[gη]. So the exponent is 0 and K = 1, contradicting the assumption that
strand s delivers a successful key.
MQV could also cancel if RB or Yb has indicator 〈−1〉, but this is excluded
by the same argument as with UM.
The argument for CF is the same as for MQV.
Key Secrecy and Impersonation. In Fig. 3 we present the core idea of key
secrecy. Suppose that the upper strand s is an initiator or responder run that
ends by computing session key K. Moreover, suppose that a listener strand is
present, which receives K. Then, if the long term secrets a, b ∈ non, this dia-
gram cannot be completed to a bundle B. This holds even without the freshness
assumptions on regular initiator and responder strands.
Security Goal 6 (Key Secrecy) Suppose that B is a Π-bundle with a, b ∈
nonB, and strand s is a Π initiator or responder strand with long term secret
parameter a and long term peer public value Y = gb. Then B does not contain
a listener • ← K.
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Theorem 7. Let protocol Π be an iadh protocol using any of the key compu-
tation methods in Eqns. 6, 8, 10, but possibly without Assumption 2, Clauses 1a
and 2a. Then Π achieves the security goal of key secrecy.
Proof. For sake of contradiction suppose that • ← K is in B. Then K is trans-
mitted on some node. Computing indicators relative to the basis 〈a, b〉, K has
indicator 〈1, 1〉 (by Eqns. 7–9, 11 and Lemma 2). By Thm. 5, some regular node
transmits a message with indicator 〈1, 1〉. But this is a contradiction, since reg-
ular strands transmit only values with indicators 〈0, 0〉 and, during certification,
〈1, 0〉 and 〈0, 1〉.
Curiously, resistance to impersonation attacks concerns the same diagram, Fig. 3,
although with different assumptions. An impersonation attack is a case in which
the adversary, having compromised A’s long term secret a, uses it to obtain a
session key K, while causing A to have a session yielding K as session key. If
A’s session uses YB = g
b, where b is the uncompromised long term secret of B,
then the adversary has succeeded in impersonating B to A.2 The protocolsMQV
and CF resist impersonation attacks, but UM does not. In this result, we rely
here on the freshness assumptions on regular initiator and responder strands,
Assumption 2, Clauses 1a and 2a. We are in effect trading off an assumption on
a long term secret for assumptions on the ephemeral values.
Security Goal 8 (Resisting Impersonation) Suppose that B is a Π-bundle
with b ∈ nonB, and strand s is a Π initiator or responder strand using ephemeral
secret x and long term peer public value Y = gb. Then B does not contain a
listener • ← K.
Theorem 9. Let protocol Π be an iadh protocol using either of the two key
computation methods in Eqns. 8 and 10. Then Π achieves the security goal of
resisting impersonation.
Proof. For sake of contradiction suppose that • ← K is in B. Then K is trans-
mitted on some node. When we compute indicators relative to the basis 〈b, x〉,
K has indicator 〈1, 1〉 (by Eqns. 7–9, 11 and Lemma 2). By Thm. 5 we conclude
that some regular node transmits a message with indicator 〈1, 1〉. But this is a
contradiction, since regular strands transmit only values with indicators 〈0, 0〉
and, during certification, 〈1, 0〉 and 〈0, 1〉.
This argument does not apply to UM, because its key K = H(gab ‖ gxy) has
indicators {〈1, 0〉, 〈0, 1〉} in this basis. Thus, Theorem 5 buys us nothing. In fact,
UM fails to prevent impersonation attacks.
Forward Secrecy. Forward secrecy is generally described as preventing disclo-
sure of the session key of a session, if the long-term secrets of the regular partic-
ipants in that session are compromised subsequently. We consider two different
2 By contrast, it is hopeless—when a is compromised—to try to prevent the adversary
from impersonating A to others.
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s1 ◦ +3 • +3 • +3 • +3 ◦
K
•
Koo
s2 ◦ +3 • +3 • +3 • +3 ◦
K
Fig. 4. Weak forward secrecy: This diagram cannot occur
◦ +3 • +3 • +3 • +3 ◦
❢
❢
❢
❢
❢
❢
❢
❢
❢
❢
❢
❢
❢
❢
•
Koo •
sk(B),b,aoo
Fig. 5. Strong Forward Secrecy: This diagram cannot occur
versions of the forward secrecy property. The first may be called weak forward se-
crecy, and all of our iadh protocols achieve it. We present weak forward secrecy
in Fig. 4. Essentially, weak forward secrecy holds because the non-originating
ephemeral values x, y prevent the adversary from computing the session key.
Thus, Assumption 2, Clauses 1a and 2a are essential.
Security Goal 10 (Weak Forward Secrecy) Suppose that B is a Π-bundle,
and strands s1, s2 are distinct Π initiator or responder strands, issuing the same
session key K. Then B does not contain a listener • ← K.
Theorem 11. Let protocol Π be an iadh protocol using any of the key com-
putation methods in Eqns. 6, 8, 10. Then Π achieves the weak forward secrecy
security goal.
Proof. Just as for Theorems 7 and 9: in this case compute indicators relative to
the basis 〈x, y〉, and note that K has indicator 〈1, 1〉 yet regular strands transmit
only values with indicators 〈0, 0〉 and, during certification, 〈1, 0〉 and 〈0, 1〉.
A stronger notion of forward secrecy stresses the word subsequently. A local
session occurs, and the compromise of the long term keys happens after that
session is finished: Can the adversary then retrieve the session key? We formalize
this idea in a diagram in which the long term secrets a, b are transmitted after
a session issuing in session key K completes. Moreover, we assume that the
long term secrets are uniquely originating. This implies that they cannot have
been used before the session completed, which is exactly the intended force of
considering a subsequent compromise.
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◦ +3 • +3
[A,B′,...]
• +3 • +3 ◦
K
◦ +3 • +3
[A′,B,...]
• +3 • +3 ◦
K
Fig. 6. Implicit authentication: In this diagram, A = A′ and B = B′
Figure 5 illustrates this situation. The slanted dotted line separates past from
future, meaning that any event northwest of the dotted line occurs before any
event southwest of it. This ordering relation between the end of the strand and
the point of disclosure is essential to the idea. Also essential is a, b, sk(B) ∈
unique, where sk(B) is B’s signing key. MQV and UM do not achieve perfect
forward secrecy. CF, like the Station-to-Station protocol (Eqn 2), does, for a
similar reason.
Security Goal 12 (Forward Secrecy) Suppose that B is a Π-bundle with
a, b, sk(B) ∈ uniqueB, and strand s is a Π initiator or responder strand us-
ing long term secret a and long term peer public value Y = gb. Suppose that
• → a, b occurs subsequent to the last reception on s. Then B does not contain
a listener • ← K.
Theorem 13. Let protocol Π be the CF protocol, with the ephemeral values
RA, RB signed as [[RA ]]sk(A) and [[RB ]]sk(B). Then Π achieves the forward se-
crecy goal.
Proof. Since [[RB ]]sk(B) is received on a node of s, and there is no compromise
of B’s signing key until it has been received, there has been a regular node
transmitting [[RB ]]sk(B). This follows from the Honest Ideal Theorem [35] or the
Authentication Test Principle [23].
Since a signed value [[RB ]]sk(B) is transmitted only on a regular initiator or
responder strand, we know that RB = g
y for some y ∈ nonB. We may now take
indicators relative to 〈x, y〉, and the rest of the proof proceeds as before.
Given the absence of signed units in MQV and UM, they have no analog to the
first step of this proof.
8 The Implicit Authentication Goal
Implicit authentication has been controversial, with a distinction between “im-
plicit key authentication” and “resisting unknown key-share attacks” [5, 25, 30].
The essential common idea is expressed in Figure 6. It shows two strands
that compute the same session key K. One has parameters [A,B′, . . .] and the
other has parameters [A′, B, . . .], where we assume that the parameter for the
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initiator’s name appears first (A,A′) and parameter for the responder’s name
appears second (B′, B). The authentication property is that the participants
agree on each other’s identities, so that the responder has the correct opinion
about the initiator’s identity and vice versa.
Implicit key authentication and resisting unknown key share attacks differ in
what non-compromise assumptions they make.
Resistance to unknown key-share attacks is the property that A = A′ and
B = B′ whenever a, b ∈ non. The weaker assertion, implicit key authentication, is
that A = A′ and B = B′ whenever a, b, a′ ∈ non. The additional non-compromise
assumption is about a′, the long term secret of the principal E that B thinks he
is communicating with:
by definition the provision of implicit key authentication is considered
only where B engages in the protocol with an honest entity (which E
isn’t). [5]
Law et al. [30] use similar language. Resisting unknown key share attacks is sim-
pler and more robust, and we will refer to it as implicit authentication (without
“key”).
Security Goal 14 (Implicit Authentication) Suppose that B is a Π-bundle
with a, b, sk(B) ∈ nonB, and strands s1, s2 are Π initiator and responder strands
with parameters [A,B′, a, x, YB′ , RB′ ] and [A
′, B, b, y, YA′ , RA′ ] resp., where s1, s2
both yield session key K. Then A = A′ and B = B′.
Weak implicit authentication states that A = A′, under the extra assumption
that there exists an a′ ∈ nonB such that YA′ = g
a′ . Symmetrically, B = B′,
under the extra assumption that there exists a b′ ∈ nonB such that YB′ = g
b′ .
We will prove four results. We will show that UM and CF achieve implicit
authentication. Moreover, MQV achieves weak implicit authentication. Finally,
(strong) implicit authentication holds forMQV, under an additional assumption.
Of these protocols, UM allows the simplest proof.
Theorem 15. UM achieves implicit authentication.
Proof. Let s1, s2 be strands in B as in the implicit authentication goal, where
also a, b ∈ nonB. Since s1 receives a certificate [[ cert YB′ ‖ B
′ ]]sk(CA), by Assump-
tion 3, sk(CA) ∈ nonB. Hence, there was a certifying strand that transmitted
this certificate, and by 3, Cl. 2a, YB′ = g
b′ for some b′. By symmetry, YA′ = g
a′ .
The key computation, with the injectiveness of ‖ and H ,3 ensures ga
′b =
gab
′
, hence a′b = ab′. Thus, there is some c such that a′ = ca and b′ = cb.
Applying Cor. 1, we conclude B′ = B. Symmetrically, A′ = A.
Using indicators in a richer way than previously, we obtain:
Theorem 16. CF achieves implicit authentication, when the strands s1, s2 re-
ceive [[RB′ ]]sk(B′) and [[RA′ ]]sk(A′), and sk(A
′), sk(B′) ∈ nonB.
3 In the symbolic model, hash functions are modeled as injective.
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xy′ xb′ y′a ab′
〈0, 0, 1, ?, ?, 1〉 〈?, ?, 1, 0, ?, 0〉 〈1, 0, 0, ?, ?, 1〉 〈1, ?, 0, 0, 0, 0〉
〈0, 0, ?, 1, 1, ?〉 〈0, 1, ?, 0, 1, ?〉 〈?, ?, 0, 1, 0, ?〉 〈?, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0〉
x′y x′b ya′ a′b
Table 4. Indicator vectors for CF authentication
Proof. We start with a, b ∈ nonB, and Assumption 2 tells us x, y ∈ nonB. Using
the signatures, there exist regular initiator or responder strands transmitting
[[RB′ ]]sk(B′) and [[RA′ ]]sk(A′). Hence, by Assumption 2, RA′ = g
x′ and RB′ = g
y′ ,
where x′, y′ ∈ nonB and g
x′ , gy
′
∈ uniqueB. We may also use the certificates (as in
the previous proof) to infer that YB′ = g
b′ and YA′ = g
a′ . Also ga
′
, gb
′
∈ uniqueB.
Since the strands compute the same session key,
gxy
′
· gxb
′
· gy
′a · gab
′
= gx
′y · gx
′b · gya
′
· ga
′b (12)
We also know that none of these parameters can be replaced by a compound ex-
pression, since they are independently chosen on regular strands. Moreover, none
of x, y, x′, y′ can equal any of a, b, a′, b′, as gx, gy, gx
′
, gy
′
are uniquely originating,
on initiator or responder strands. The exponentials of the latter all originate on
certificate request strands.
Moreover, if x = y, then s1 = s2, so A = A
′ and B = B′, and authentication
is assured. So assume x 6= y.
We compute indicators for the four monomials on each side of Eqn. 12, as
shown in Table 4. We use as basis the non-originating parameters a, b, x, y, x′, y′,
in this order. Since we do not know whether the primed variables equal their
unprimed counterparts, there are undetermined entries (?) in the indicator vec-
tors; an integer 0 or 1 shows the definite presence or absence of a parameter.
In the table, every vertically aligned pair is compatible, i.e. we can fill in the
undetermined entries so as to make the vectors agree. Moreover, if two vectors
are not vertically aligned, they are incompatible. For instance, the rightmost
entries have 0s for all the slots for ephemeral parameters, which put them in
conflict with all of the other vectors.
Hence, xy′ = x′y,. . . , ab′ = a′b. Since each of these is a parameter, and not
compound, we have x = x′, y = y′, a = a′, b = b′. Applying Cor. 1, A = A′ and
B = B′.
Turning now to MQV:
Theorem 17. MQV achieves weak implicit authentication.
Proof. Let s1, s2 be strands in B as in the weak implicit authentication goal,
where also a, b, a′ ∈ nonB and YA′ = g
a′ . Here the starting point is weaker than
in CF, since we do not know that RB′ , RA′ originate on regular strands; we know
only that they are group elements, so of the form gη, gψ, resp., for ψ, η : NZE.
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xη aη[gx] xβ[gη] aβ[gx][gη]
〈?, ?, ?, 1, ?〉 〈1, ?, ?, ?, ?〉 〈?, ?, ?, 1, ?〉 〈1, ?, ?, ?, ?〉
〈?, ?, ?, ?, 1〉 〈?, ?, 1, ?, ?〉 〈?, 1, ?, 0, 1〉 〈?, 1, 1, 0, 0〉
ψy ψb[gy] a′y[gψ] a′b[gy][gψ]
Table 5. Indicator vectors for MQV weak authentication
Likewise, YB′ , having been certified, is some group element g
β . Since s1, s2 yield
the same key, we have:
gxη · gaη[g
x] · gxβ[g
η] · gaβ[g
x][gη ]
= gψy · gψb[g
y ] · ga
′y[gψ] · ga
′b[gy ][gψ ]
An adversary strategy for solving this consists of an assignment of possibly
compound expressions to the Greek letters ψ, η, β. The adversary wins if both
sides of this equation reduce to the same normal form, but without forcing
A = A′.
We write the indicator vectors for this in Table 5, relative to the basis
〈a, a′, b, x, y〉, all in non. There are many entries ?, because we do not know
whether a = a′, or what the adversary incorporated into the Greek letters β, η, ψ.
Nevertheless, the lower right entry has 0 for the x slot, so it cannot equal the
first or third entry in the first row, in which the x slot is 1. This leaves two
possibilities, the second and fourth terms.
In these terms, the a slot is 1. Thus, either a′ = a or b = a. If a′ = a, we may
apply Cor 1.
So assume a′ 6= a and b = a. If we choose term 2, i.e. a′b[gy][gψ] = aη[gx],
then η = a′r, where r is the ratio of boxed terms. Turning to the term xη, we
have xη = xa′r, i.e. its y and b slots are 0. Thus, it cannot equal any of the
monomials on the RHS.
Choosing term 4, a′b[gy][gψ] = aβ[gx][gη], then β = a′r, where r is a ratio of
boxed values. But since β was certified, we can apply Cor 1 to infer that β = a′.
Plugging in, we now have a′y[gψ] with indicator 〈0, 1, 0, 0, 1〉. Since xβ[gη] has
indicator 〈0, 1, 0, 1, 0〉, there is no term in the top row that a′y[gψ] can match.
Kaliski [25] showed implicit authentication does not hold for MQV. An adver-
sary, observing A’s ephemeral public value RA = g
x, may generate a new RE
depending on RA and YA = g
a, and then a new long-term YE :
RE = g
x · (ga)[g
x] · g−1 YE = g
[RE]
−1
. (13)
Thus,RE = g
x+a[gx]−1. The adversary asks CA to certify YE , successfully proving
possession of [RE ]
−1. This is compatible with our assumptions as Ind〈a〉(YE) = 0.
E’s operations cancel out, so the certificate misleads B into thinking K is
shared with E, when it is shared with A. A mischievous priest E can cause a
criminal B to believe K shared with E, when it fact it is shared with the district
24
attorney A. E can thus induce B to misdeliver a confession to A, leading to an
unexpected plot twist in Hitchcock’s movie with Montgomery Clift [24].
Definition 7. Strands s, d with parameters [. . . , a, x, . . .] and [. . . , YA, RA] are
a doping pair if x appears in YA.
Bundle B respects ephemerals if no doping pair in B yields a shared key K.
Doping, which [25] uses, is not visible to the principal executing d. We mention
below a way to prevent it.
Theorem 18. Suppose B is an MQV bundle that respects ephemerals. Then B
satisfies (full) implicit authentication.
Proof. Let s1, s2 be strands in B as in the implicit authentication goal, where
a, b ∈ nonB and YA′ = g
α, YB′ = g
β, for α, β : NZE. RB′ , RA′ are group
elements of the form gη, gψ, resp., for ψ, η : NZE. Since s1, s2 yield the same
key,
gxη · gaη[g
x] · gxβ[g
η] · gaβ[g
x][gη ]
= gψy · gψb[g
y ] · gαy[g
ψ] · gαb[g
y ][gψ] (14)
By Cor. 1, either α = a or α = b or Ind〈a,b〉(α) = 0. Likewise, either β = a or
β = b or Ind〈a,b〉(β) = 0.
If both α, β ∈ {a, b}, then we have a case of weak authentication from both
sides, so Thm. 17 gives the desired result. Assume then that at least one, e.g. α,
has Ind〈a,b〉(α) = 0. Since B respects ephemerals, (s1, s2) is not a doping pair,
and (s2, s2) is not a doping pair, so x, y are syntactically absent from α. So in
fact Ind〈a,b,x,y〉(α) = 0. By Equation 14
xη + aη[gx] + xβ[gη] + aβ[gx][gη]
= ψy + ψb[gy] + αy[gψ] + αb[gy][gψ]
The Greek letters may be compound expressions. Thus, αy[gψ] and αb[gy][gψ]
may each yield a number of monomials when reduced to normal forms. However,
because α has indicator 0, and the boxed terms have indicator 0, monomials
resulting from αy[gψ] all have indicator 〈0, 0, 0, 1〉. Monomials resulting from
αb[gy][gψ] all have indicator 〈0, 1, 0, 0〉.
When the LHS normalizes, no monomial on the LHS can have indicator
〈0, 1, 0, 0〉 or 〈0, 0, 0, 1〉 because each one has a factor of x or a. So, the last two
summands on the RHS cannot contribute any monomials to the normal form.
By Lemma 2, the LHS has non-zero contributions of a and x. Hence, ψ must
have non-zero contributions of them.
We write ψ as the sum ψ = ψnz + ψ0, where ψnz collects all the monomials
in ψ with non-zero indicators, and ψ0 collects all those with indicator 0.
In particular, ψ0y must cancel αy[g
ψ], and ψ0b[g
y] must cancel αb[gy][gψ].
Each of these leads to the conclusion:
−(ψ0/[g
ψ]) = α. (15)
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Hence the normal form of ψ0 must be some ϕ[g
ψ ], so that [gψ], which has
occurrences of x, can syntactically cancel. Hence, the normal form of ψ is
ψnz + ϕ[g
ψ],
contradicting the well-foundedness of the syntactic terms.
The preceding analysis sheds some light on Kaliski’s attack (13) on MQV. There,
equation 15 holds with ψ0 = −1 and α = [g
ψ]−1. However, we here have the
additional assumption above that B respects ephemerals: since s1, s2 is not a
doping pair, α can have no occurrence of x, but as we have observed, ψ must.
The interesting approaches to preventing the Kaliski attack—that is, to en-
sure that executions respect ephemerals—involve time and causality. Suppose
that the CA always takes at least a minimum time tC between receiving a certi-
fication request and issuing the certificate. Moreover, the initiator always times
out and discards a session if it does not complete within a period tI , where
tI < tC . For instance, if TC is an hour and tI is a half hour, this approach
would be practically workable. No synchronization between different principals
is required for this, since each participant makes purely local decisions about
timing. Non-malicious sessions would be entirely unaffected. Then, in any com-
pleted session, no certified value can involve an ephemeral in that session, since
it cannot yet have been generated at the time the value was certified.
9 Uniform Equality and the Completeness of AGˆ
In this section we justify the use of AG ,ˆ specifically the use of AG -ˆnormal
forms to model messages. Any theorem of AGˆ surely holds in all DH-structures.
Theorem 19 gives us the converse, namely that every equation that holds in all
DH-structures is a theorem of AG .ˆ Indeed, given a non-principal ultraflter D
over the set of primes, there is a single structure MD that is “generic” for all of
the DH-structures: An equation s = t is valid in MD if and only if it is valid in
infinitely many DH-structures.
We work first with models of the language of AGˆ but with the [·] removed
from the signature. They have all the structure required to analyze UM and CF.
We then extend our results to DH-structures equipped with a [·] function.
Algebraically isomorphic structures can have very different computational
properties. Indeed, the prime field Fq presented as the group of integers mod q
induces a DH-structure where the base group is the additive group of Fq and
exponentiation is multiplication. The discrete log problem in this structure is
computationally tractable. However, Fq is isomorphic to a subgroup of order q of
the multiplicative group of integers modulo some prime p. There, the discrete log
problem may be intractable. Although the algebra is blind to the computational
distinctions, we focus here on the algebraic equations between terms in DH-
structures.
First, we show that the field of scalars, i.e. the exponents, carries all the
algebraic information in a model of AG .ˆ
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Definition 8. Let F be a field. We construct a [·]-free model MF of theory AGˆ
as follows. The sorts E and G are each interpreted as the domain of F ; the
sort NZE is interpreted as the set of non-0 elements of E. The operations of
E are interpreted just as in F itself. The operation · is taken to be + from E,
thus 1 and inv are taken to be 0 and −. Exponentiation is multiplication: ae is
interpreted as a ∗ e.
For each field F , anyMF satisfies all of the equations in AG .ˆ When F is the prime
field of order q then MF = MFq is, up to isomorphism, precisely the standard
DH algebra of order q. When F is the additive group of rational numbers then
MF = MQ will be of interest to us below.
The key device for reasoning about uniform equality across DH-structures
is the notion of ultraproduct, cf. e.g. [9]. We let the variable D range over non-
principal ultrafilters over the set of prime numbers.
Definition 9. Let D be a non-principal ultrafilter over the set of prime num-
bers and let FD be the ultraproduct structure
∏
D{Fq | q prime}. MFD is the DH
structure obtained from FD via Definition 8. For simplicity we write MD for
MFD .
The crucial facts about ultraproducts for our purposes are: (i) a first-order
sentence is true in an ultraproduct if and only if the set of indices at which it
is true is a set in D; (ii) when D is non-principal, every cofinite set is in D. We
show below that the set of equations valid in MD does not depend on which
non-principal D we use.
FD is a field, since each Fq satisfies the first-order axioms for fields. FD has
characteristic 0, since each equation 1 + 1 + . . . + 1 = 0 is false in all but finitely
many Fq. Indeed, it is false in all but one Fq.
Lemma 3. The structure MQ can be embedded as a submodel in any MD.
Proof. Since FD has characteristic 0, and Q is the prime field of characteristic
0, Q is embeddable in FD. The models MD and Q are definitional expansions of
FD and Q, so the embedding of Q into FD extends to embed MQ into MD.
Lemma 4. Let t : G be in normal form, in the [·]-free sublanguage of AG .ˆ There
exists an environment η : Vars → Q such that if u and u′ are distinct subterms
of t, η(u) 6= η(u′) in MQ[D].
Proof. In the structure MQ, exponentiation is interpreted as multiplication, so
it suffices to consider the expression obtained by replacing · and inv by + and
−, and the exponentiation operator by ∗ , and viewing t as an ordinary rational
expression in several variables x1, . . . , xk (the variables occurring in t). We may
view t as determining a real function ft : R
k → R. In fact each subterm t′ of t
similarly determines a function from Rk to R (not all variables of t will occur in
all subterms, but we may still treat each as inducing a k-ary function). So the
family of subterms of t determines a (finite) set of rational functions, and we can
find a rational point r = (r1, ..., rk) such that no two of these functions agree on
r. We define η to map each xi to ri.
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Corollary 2. If s and t are distinct normal forms then it is not the case that
MQ |= s = t.
Proof. Form the term u ≡ s · inv(t). Since s and t are distinct normal forms this
term is in normal form. By Lemma 4 there is an environment η with η(s) 6= η(t),
and the result follows.
AGˆ is complete for uniform equality in the absence of the [·]-function:
Theorem 19. For each pair of G-terms s and t in the [·]-free fragment of AG ,ˆ
the following are equivalent
1. AGˆ ⊢ s = t
2. For all q, MFq |= s = t
3. For all non-principal D, MD |= s = t
4. For some non-principal D, MD |= s = t
5. MQ |= s = t
6. if s reduces to s′ with s′ irreducible, and t reduces to t′ with t′ irreducible,
then s′ and t′ are identical modulo associativity and commutativity of ·, +,
and ∗ .
Proof. It suffices to establish the cycle of entailments 1 implies 2 . . . implies
6 implies 1. The first three of these steps are immediate, as is the fact that 6
implies 1. The fact that 4 implies 5 follows from Lemma 3. To conclude 6 from
5, use Corollary 2.
As a corollary of Theorem 19, these equivalences hold for E-term equations as
well. Given terms e and e′, form the equation ge = ge
′
. It is provable iff e = e′
is provable, and is true in a given model M iff e = e′ is.
Corollary 3. If MFq |= s = t holds for infinitely many q, then for all q, MFq |=
s = t.
Proof. Suppose that {q : MFq |= s = t} is infinite. Then there is a non-principal
ultrafilter D containing this set. So (4) in Thm. 19 holds, and we apply (4)⇒(2).
The equivalence of AG -ˆprovability with equality in the models is the technical
core of our claim that AGˆ captures “uniform equality.”
The model MQ is convenient: this single model, based on a familiar structure,
serves to witness uniform equality simplifies analyses. Our first analysis of MQV
used this.
The modelMD satisfies an even more striking property. It follows from results
of Ax [3] that the first-order theory of MD is decidable. So the structure MD is
an attractive one for closer study of the “uniform” properties of DH-structures.
Incorporating [·]. An analogue of Theorem 19 holds for the full language of
AG ,ˆ the language appropriate for reasoning about MQV. The starting point is
like Lemma 4.
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Lemma 5. Let t : G be in normal form, in the language of AG .ˆ There exists
an interpretation of the [·] function and an environment η such such that if u
and u′ are distinct subterms of t, η(u) 6= η(u′) in MQ.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of [·]-subterms of t. If this
number is 0 then we may apply Lemma 4 and simply use the following simple
[·] function: [a] = a if a 6= 0 and [0] = 1.
Otherwise let [s] be a subterm of t such that s is [·]-free. Let t′ be the term
obtained from t by replacing each occurrence of [s] by a variable v occurring
nowhere in t. Then t′ is in normal form, so by induction there is a function [·]0
and an environment η that acts as an injection over the subterms of t′. We may
assume that η is defined on all the variables of t (even though some may not
occur in t′). We claim that we can define [·] so that the resulting function, taken
with the same environment η satisfies the Lemma. We define [·] to agree with
[·]0 on all values except η(s), where we put [η(s)] = η(v). Since η is guaranteed
to yield different values on distinct subterms of t′, the use of [·]0 will yield the
same values as the use of [·] on subterms of t other than [s].
By an argument similar to that establishing Corollary 2 we obtain
Corollary 4. AGˆ ⊢ s = t iff for all [·] functions MQ |= s = t.
From this follows, finally:
Theorem 20. For each pair of G-terms s and t in the full language of AGˆ the
following are equivalent
1. AGˆ ⊢ s = t
2. For all q and all [·] functions on MFq , MFq |= s = t
3. For all non-principal D, for all [·] functions on MD, MD |= s = t
4. For some non-principal D, and all [·] functions on MD, MD |= s = t
5. for all [·] functions on MQ, MQ |= s = t
6. if s reduces to s′ with s′ irreducible, and t reduces to t′ with t′ irreducible,
then s′ and t′ are identical modulo associativity and commutativity of ·, +,
and ∗ .
Proof. As for Theorem 19 we can establish a cycle of entailments. The non-trivial
changes to the arguments presented for Theorem 19 are
– to conclude 5 from 4 now, we observe that given a [·]-function on MQ that
entails MQ |= s 6= t we can, via the embedding of MQ into MD, construct a
[·]-function on MD such that MD |= s 6= t, and
– to conclude 6 from 5 now, we use Corollary 4.
10 Conclusion and Related Work
Related Work. Within the symbolic model, there has been substantial work
on some aspects of DH, starting with Boreale and Buscemi [7], which provides
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a symbolic semantics [1, 18, 32] for a process calculus with algebraic operations
for DH. Their symbolic semantics is based on unification.
Indeed, symbolic approaches to protocol analysis have relied on unification as
a central part of their reasoning. Goubault-Larrecq, Roger, and Verma [20] use a
method based on Horn clauses and resolution modulo AC, providing automated
proofs of passive security. Maude-NPA [16, 17] is also usable to analyze many
protocols involving DH, again depending heavily on unification.
All of these approaches appear to face a fundamental problem with a theory
like the AGˆ theory of Section 9, in which it would be unwise to rely on the
decidability of the unifiability problem. Unifiability is undecidable in the the-
ory of rings, essentially by the unsolvability of Hilbert’s tenth problem. There
are, however, many related theories for which undecidability is not known, for
instance the diophantine theory of the rationals [4].
Ku¨sters and Truderung [29] finesse this issue by rewriting protocol analysis
problems. The original problems use an AC theory involving exponentiation.
They transform it into a corresponding problem that does not require the AC
property, and so can work using standard ProVerif resolution [6]. Their approach
covers a surprising range of protocols, although, like [10], not iadh protocols such
as MQV or CF.
Another contrast between this paper and previous work is the uniform treat-
ment of numerous security goals. Our methods are applicable to confidentiality,
authentication, and further properties such as forward secrecy.
Our adversary model is active. For passive attacks, there has been some work
on computational soundness for Diffie-Hellman, with Bresson et al. [8] giving an
excellent treatment.
Conclusion and Future Work. In this paper, we have applied the strand
space framework to iadh protocols, such as UM, CF, and MQV, establishing
about a dozen security properties of them. While all of them have been previously
claimed, few have been proved in as informative a way as we do here. Moreover,
our proofs rely on a few fundamental principles that can be easily applied. They
combine rewriting techniques and the indicator idea.
We also provided a deeper model-theoretic treatment that justifies our rewrit-
ing theory with respect to an adversary model. Our adversary can use any al-
gebraic facts that are true in all but finitely many DH-structures. Since other
cryptographic primitives such as bilinear pairings are built by enriching DH-
structures, it is highly desirable to have proof techniques that work in this rich
algebraic framework.
Connecting this with the standard computational model remains for future
work. In our model the adversary must choose its whole strategy before seeing
the concrete messages for a particular run, or even knowing the prime q. This
raises the question of the computational soundness of our approach, a focus
of future research: Does the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption ensure that
the adversary gets no asymptotic advantage from knowing q and the concrete
messages?
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Our proofs here are handcrafted. However, we are currently pursuing an
approach using model-finding in geometric logic, a generalization of Horn logic,
which offers great promise for mechanizing many of these conclusions.
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